ABSTRACT. Azrieli et al. (2018) provide a characterization of incentive compatible payment mechanisms for experiments, assuming subjects' preferences respect dominance but can have any possible subjective beliefs over random outcomes. If instead we assume subjects view probabilities as objective-for example, when dice or coins are used-then the set of incentive compatible mechanisms may grow. In this paper we show that it does, but the added mechanisms are not widely applicable. As in the subjective-beliefs framework, the only broadly-applicable incentive compatible mechanism (assuming preferences only respect dominance) is to pay subjects for one randomly-selected decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider an experiment in which subjects make two choices. The first is to choose from the set {apple,left shoe}, and the second is to choose from the set {banana,right shoe}.
Most subjects would prefer the apple over the left shoe and the banana over the right shoe. But when both choices are paid then subjects may choose the shoes instead, because they prefer a pair of shoes over having both an apple and a banana. In other words, complementarities between choice objects may distort subjects' choices when multiple decisions are given. An experimenter might infer incorrectly that the left shoe is preferred to the apple and that the right shoe is preferred to the banana. In this case we say that the payment mechanism is not incentive compatible (IC) because it did not incentivize subjects to reveal their true preference in each individual problem separately.
1
A proposed solution to the problem of complementarities (due to Allais, 1953) is to pay for one randomly-selected decision. We call this the Random Problem Selection (RPS) mechanism.
2 With this mechanism subjects cannot receive both shoes, and therefore have no incentive to choose the shoe in either decision problem. Although this solves the complementarities problem, it introduces randomness. And there are examples of preferences over lotteries for which the RPS mechanism is not IC. 3 Thus, exact conditions under which this mechanism is incentive compatible were not well understood.
Neither was it known whether other mechanisms can be used to guarantee truthful revelation of choices in experiments with multiple decisions.
In our earlier work (Azrieli et al., 2018) we filled this gap by studying experiment incentives in a general framework in which subjects are permitted to have any subjective belief over random outcomes. Assuming state-wise monotonicity (which requires that subject's preference respects dominance) and nothing else, we showed that the RPS mechanism is the only incentive compatible mechanism that can be applied to any experiment. There can be contrived examples of experiments for which other mechanisms are incentive compatible, but these are almost never seen in practice.
But what if an experiment consists entirely of objective lotteries? For example, suppose the experimenter flips a fair coin to determine which problem is paid. In this case allowing subjects to have any belief distribution over random outcomes may be too permissive. But if we restrict beliefs to equal the objective probabilities then we restrict 1 Shoes are an extreme example of complementarities. For a more realistic example, suppose each shoe is a risky lottery, and the pair of lotteries together constitutes a less-risky portfolio of lotteries. 2 This is often called the Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism (RLIM). We choose RPS to stay consistent with our terminology in our other paper. 3 An early example is Holt (1986) . See Azrieli et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of such examples.
the model, and in doing so we may open the door for additional incentive compatible mechanisms. Thus, it is important to study whether the set of incentive compatible mechanisms grows when we assume objective lotteries, and whether any of the new mechanisms would have broad applicability.
In this paper we assume objective probabilities and that all preferences which respect stochastic dominance are admissible. In this framework we show that the set of IC mechanisms is strictly larger than that characterized by Azrieli et al. (2018) . But the newly-identified mechanisms are again only applicable in certain contrived experiments.
In almost every real-world experiment the RPS mechanism is the unique incentive compatible mechanism under our assumptions.
As in Azrieli et al. (2018) , we model an experiment as a list of decision problems,
i.e. a list of sets of choice objects from which the subject should choose. The subject announces a chosen object from each decision problem. The experimenter then maps that announced vector of choices into a payment, which may be random. For example, the RPS mechanism takes the announced vector of choices and randomly chooses one of them for payment.
A crucial observation in this analysis is that the choice objects and the payment objects in an experiment are typically non-overlapping sets. In the example above the set of all choice objects would be {apple,banana,left shoe,right shoe}. The experimenter is interested in learning the subject's preferences over those choice objects, which we denote by ≻. 4 But the subject is actually choosing from among payment objects. With the RPS mechanism, the payment objects would be a collection of lotteries over choice objects. 5 And the choice over payment objects is governed by the subject's preferences over lotteries, which we denote by * . Specifically, the subject chooses the message vector that maps into her most-preferred payment object (according to * ). We say that the payment mechanism is incentive compatible if each announced message is her mostpreferred choice object from each decision problem (according to ≻). In other words, incentive compatibility ensures that the subject will reveal truthfully her most-preferred choice in every problem.
4 Or, at least, which objects are most preferred in each set. 5 Specifically, the 50-50 lottery between an apple and a banana, the 50-50 lottery between an apple and a right shoe, the 50-50 lottery between a left shoe and a banana, and the 50-50 lottery between the left and right shoes.
We refer to * as an extension of ≻. For us to study incentive compatibility we must first make some assumptions about how * relates to ≻. If they are not relatedmeaning every extension is admissible-then no mechanism can be incentive compatible. This is Proposition 0 of Azrieli et al. (2018) . A natural restriction on extensions is that they satisfy monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance (FOSD), relative to the underlying preference ≻. Formally, an extension is monotonic if lottery f is preferred to lottery g whenever f dominates g in the sense of FOSD. Monotonicity places no restrictions on lotteries that are not ranked by dominance.
We show in Theorem 1 that, as long as all admissible extensions are monotonic, the RPS mechanism is IC. In other words, if a subject's preferences are such that she never prefers a dominated gamble, then any RPS mechanism provides her the right incentives to truthfully reveal her favorite element in each decision problem. The logic is simple:
any time a subject switches from telling the truth to lying on any decision problem, they shift probability away from their most-preferred object and onto a less-preferred item. The resulting lottery is therefore stochastically dominated by the lottery induced by truth-telling. Notice that expected utility is not needed for this argument; the RPS mechanism is incentive compatible as long as monotonicity is satisfied. Monotonicity is satisfied by nearly every decision-theoretic model of choice under uncertainty. Indeed, it is often viewed as normative, and models that violate monotonicity are often dismissed as implausible (see Quiggin, 1982, e.g.) . Thus we view monotonicity as a minimal assumption on * , though we discuss its limitations in the sequel and more extensively in Azrieli et al. (2018) .
Assuming all monotonic extensions are admissible (and that beliefs coincide with objective probabilities), we characterize the class of all IC mechanisms for any given experiment. The main result of this paper, Theorem 2, shows that, in a certain sense, any IC mechanism resembles the RPS mechanism, but that the class of IC mechanisms may extend beyond the RPS mechanism in certain contrived experiments.
To understand how incentive compatibility could extend beyond the RPS mechanism in some experiments, consider the following example. Let D 1 = {x, y}, D 2 = { y, z} and D 3 = {x, z} be the three decision problems in some experiment. Now, for every (strict) preference over {x, y, z}, if the subject truthfully announces her choices, then her favorite alternative from the set E = {x, y, z} will also be revealed. Below we will call sets with this property surely identified sets. We can imagine an RPS-like mechanism that not 6 If additional axioms are assumed on * then expected utility may become necessary. For example, if * satisfies the reduction of compound lotteries, then assuming monotonicity implies that * satisfies expected utility. We discuss this in Section VI.
only pays for choices in the actual decision problems, but also might pay for the inferred choice from this surely identified set E. For instance, consider the distribution λ over subsets of {x, y, z} given by λ(D 1 ) = λ(D 2 ) = λ(D 3 ) = 0.3 and λ(E) = 0.1. And suppose the subject has preferences x ≻ y ≻ z. If she announces truthfully in each D i then their message vector will be (x, y, x) , and the experimenter can use that to infer that x is also her most-preferred element in E. The mechanism will therefore pay x with probability λ(D 1 )+λ(D 3 )+λ(E) = 0.7 and y with probability λ(D 2 ) = 0.3. If the subject misrepresents and instead announces (y, y, x) , then y would be inferred to be the most-preferred in E, so the subject would instead receive x with probability 0.3 and y with probability 0.7. This is strictly dominated by the truth-telling lottery, so any subject who respects dominance will not choose it. Indeed, any non-truthful message will result in a dominated lottery, so the mechanism is incentive compatible under monotonicity. Still, we can generalize even further by allowing λ to put negative weight on some of the sets. For instance, set λ(D 1 ) = λ(D 2 ) = λ(D 3 ) = 0.4 and λ(E) = −0.2. For our subject with x ≻ y ≻ z reporting truthfully in this mechanism pays x with probability 0.6 and y with probability 0.4. Misrepresenting by announcing (y, y, z) would again switch those probabilities, leading to a dominated lottery. However, if we choose the weights to be
.6 and λ(E) = −0.8, then the resulting mechanism will not be incentive compatible, since the revealed second-best alternative (y) is now paid with a higher probability than the revealed first-best alternative (x). Thus, some restrictions must be placed on λ in order for incentive compatibility to hold in the resulting mechanism. Theorem 2 shows that, in any experiment, any IC mechanism can be represented by a particular λ as above, and precisely describes the restrictions on λ that guarantee incentive compatibility.
It is illuminating to compare this characterization to the one obtained in our previous paper (Azrieli et al., 2018) . In that work we characterize incentive compatibility of experiments under monotonicity, but when mechanisms map choices to acts instead of objective lotteries.
8 Monotonicity in that framework means that if f is preferred to g in every possible state of the world, then f is preferred to g; otherwise their ranking is not restricted. The acts framework allows for more general extensions of preferences: Subjects may have their own subjective beliefs about the likelihood of different outcomes 7 For simplicity we assume here that the subject's choices are consistent with some strict ordering of the elements. In our formal treatment we also deal with the issue of 'non-rationalizable' message vectors, such as (x, y, z). 8 Acts map states into outcomes but do not specify objective probabilities for the states.
of the randomization device, or they may even have preferences which are not probabilistically sophisticated (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992) ; e.g., they may be uncertainty averse. This might apply when subjects view the experimenter's randomization as ambiguous. The assumption of the current paper that subjects view payments as lotteries can be thought of as an additional restriction on the set of admissible extensions in the acts framework. Since the experimenter can use this additional knowledge about extensions to construct IC mechanisms, one would expect that the class of IC mechanisms will be larger in the case of lotteries. In Section V we show that this is indeed the case: If a mechanism is IC in the acts framework, and one puts some (full-support) distribution over the state space of the randomization device, then the resulting lottery mechanism is IC. However, there are IC mechanisms in the lotteries environment that cannot be generated by any IC acts mechanism; in fact, these are exactly the mechanisms whose distribution λ uses negative weights.
Although the set of IC mechanisms grows when we restrict attention to objective lotteries, the new mechanisms all require the existence of surely identified sets, such as E = {x, y, z} in the example above. But most experiments do not have surely identified sets, because most experiments have no overlap between decision problems. Thus, we view our result as confirming the conclusion of Azrieli et al. (2018) : if we assume that preferences respect only stochastic dominance then, in practice, the RPS mechanism is the only incentive compatible mechanism. Nothing is gained by assuming objective probabilities.
Finally, in Section VI we consider the particular case of experiments in which the choice objects are themselves lotteries over money. In this set-up an RPS mechanism generates a compound lottery, where in the first 'upper' stage a decision problem is randomly chosen for payment, and in the second 'lower' stage a dollar amount is randomly chosen according to the lottery that the subject chose in the realized decision problem of the first stage. Examples in the literature (Holt, 1986, e.g.) show that if the subject reduces compound lotteries according to the laws of probability and has Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) preferences over lotteries over money, then the RPS may not be IC. Our framework and results make it easy to see the source of the failure: Reduction of compound lotteries together with monotonicity imply the independence axiom. Since RDU preferences typically violate independence, if one assumes reduction then it must be the case that monotonicity does not hold. Our Theorem 1 cannot be applied then, and the RPS may not be IC. In fact, we show that if subjects reduce compound lotteries and if all RDU preferences are admissible then no IC mechanism exists. Fortunately, empirical evidence suggests that it is rare for subjects to satisfy reduction but violate expected utility (Halevy, 2007) , so such violations of monotonicity may not be a large concern.
The issue of complementarities (paying both the left shoe and the right shoe) was addressed in Azrieli et al. (2018) . There we showed that an incentive compatible mechanism can never pay in 'bundles' unless the researcher is willing to assume that subjects' preferences exhibit no complementarities. But that conclusion holds whether we allow for subjective beliefs or objective probabilities, so the result is exactly the same in the current framework of objective lotteries. If the experimenter is going to pay for multiple decision problems (thus forming a bundle) then complementarities must be assumed away. We therefore restrict attention to non-bundle payments in this paper. See Azrieli et al. (2018) for exactly what assumptions on complementarities are needed for incentive compatibility in that case.
In Azrieli et al. (2018) we discuss many other aspects of incentives in experiments, including the strength of the monotonicity assumption. See that paper for a much more complete discussion of these issues, and for a more thorough review of the related literature.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
There is a finite set X of choice objects. The decision maker (also called the subject) has a strict preference relation ≻ over X which is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
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The relation ≻ is not complete because it is not reflexive (it is not true that x ≻ x), so we use x y to mean that either
and U(x, ≻) = { y ∈ X : y x} be the (weak) lower-and upper-contour sets of x according to ≻, respectively. The ≻-dominant element of any set E ⊆ X is denoted by dom ≻ (E).
That is, dom ≻ (E) is the unique element of E satisfying dom ≻ (E) y for all y ∈ E.
The researcher has an exogenously-given list of k decision problems, denoted
of decision problems. We assume throughout that each D i ∈ D is non-trivial, meaning 9 For example, we discuss how this theory extends to experiments where subjects make choices sequentially with feedback, the use of the strategy method, plausible violations of monotonicity (including hedging with ambiguity aversion), and the application of these results to game-theoretic (multi-player) experiments. We also discuss relevant experimental results (which are covered even more extensively in Brown and Healy, 2018) and the related theoretical literature. 10 Allowing for weak preferences will only shrink the set of IC mechanisms. As in Azrieli et al. (2018) , we conjecture that the set of IC mechanism with weak preferences would still be larger than just the RPS mechanism, but we have not achieved a characterization. Regardless, it is clear that the RPS mechanism would still be on the only IC mechanism with broad applicability.
|D i | > 1, and that the same decision problem does not appear more than once, meaning
These assumptions are made only to simplify notation and can easily be relaxed.
The subject is asked to choose an element from each D i . The announced choice vector (or, the subject's message) is denoted by m = (m 1 , . . ., m k ). The space of all possible
. We refer to µ(≻) as the truthful message for ≻.
We assume that an objective randomization device can be used to determine payoffs, so that payments are given by lotteries. Denote by ∆(X ) the set of all probability dis-
is the probability with which x ∈ X is selected
and awards the subject with the lottery ϕ(m) ∈ ∆(X ). Thus, ϕ(m)(x) denotes the probability with which x is awarded when the decision maker announces m.
We refer to the pair (D, ϕ) as an experiment; D completely specifies the choices the subject must face, and ϕ describes how they are paid for those choices. Since D determines the domain of a mechanism, there is little distinguishing an experiment (D, ϕ) from its associated mechanism ϕ; when it causes no confusion, we refer to experiments and mechanisms interchangeably.
We assume that the subject's preferences ≻ extend to the space of lotteries ∆(X ). An extension of ≻ to ∆(X ) is denoted by * , and we assume that any admissible extension is complete and transitive. Although ≻ is strict, * may not be. The asymmetric part of * is denoted by ≻ * . An extension * is assumed to agree with ≻ on the space of degenerate lotteries. We let E (≻) denote the set of admissible extensions of ≻. Think of E as capturing the assumptions the experimenter is willing to make about the subject's preferences over lotteries. For example, if the experimenter assumes that the subject is a risk-averse expected utility maximizer, then E (≻) is the set of extensions * that have an expected utility representation with a concave cardinal utility index u : X → R that ordinally agrees with ≻ (meaning, u(x) > u(y) if and only if x ≻ y).
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Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism ϕ is incentive compatible with respect to E if, for every preference ≻, every extension * ∈ E (≻), and every
11 We assume implicitly that the experimenter has a set of admissible preferences over X in mind; when we say "for all ≻", we really mean "for all admissible ≻". Our results hold for any set of admissible strict preferences, including the set of all strict preferences on X .
In other words, incentive compatible experiments induce the subject to announce truthfully, treating each decision problem as though it were in isolation. Note that whether or not a mechanism (or experiment) is incentive compatible depends crucially on E . When there is no confusion, we drop the reference to E and simply refer to ϕ as incentive compatible.
In some experiments subjects are paid for all of their decisions, or for some randomlyselected subset of decisions. In those cases, payment objects are 'bundles' of choice ob- 
If there is strict inequality for at least one x then we say f strictly dominates g with respect to ≻ ( f ⊐ g).
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Definition 3 (Monotonic Extension). An extension
Monotonicity is satisfied by nearly every model in decision theory; indeed, many authors view it as normative.
13
The following simple lemmas will be useful for some of the following results. The proofs are omitted.
12 Because it will always be obvious, we use a notation which suppresses the dependence of ⊒ and ⊐ on ≻.
13 For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
Remark. The conclusion of Lemma 2 continues to hold even if the set of admissible extensions E (≻) does not contain all monotonic extensions, as long as this set is "sufficiently rich". For example, if any expected utility extension is admissible then the lemma is still true.
III. THE RANDOM PROBLEM SELECTION MECHANISM
A common payment mechanism is one in which a single decision problem is randomly selected, and the subject is paid with her choice at that problem. We call such a mechanism a Random Problem-Selection (RPS) Mechanism. Formally,
Definition 4 (Random Problem-Selection Mechanism).
A mechanism ϕ is a random problem-selection mechanism (RPS) if there exists a full-support probability distri-
for every ≻ and ϕ is an RPS mechanism, then ϕ is incentive compatible with respect to E .
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 1, and from the obvious fact that lying in an RPS mechanism induces a lottery that is strictly dominated by the lottery obtained by truth-telling.
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS
In this section we provide a complete characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms when all monotonic extensions are admissible (or when the set of admissible extensions is sufficiently rich, see the Remark after Lemma 2). Recall that, by Lemma 2, incentive compatibility in this set-up is equivalent to the property that the lottery obtained by truth-telling strictly dominates any lottery that can be obtained by lying.
The example in the introduction illustrates how incentive compatibility can extend beyond the RPS mechanism. We now introduce notation and definitions required to formally state and prove the characterization result.
Surely Identified Sets
is then defined as the set of non-rationalizable messages. The relation R(m) is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric, but it need not be com-
yR(m)x} the sets of elements that are revealed to be worse than x and better than x under choices m, re-
, with strict inclusions for some x when R(m) is not a complete relation. 
Definition 6 (Surely Identified Sets

Weighted Set-Selection Mechanisms
We can now define a generalization of RPS mechanisms called weighted set-selection (WSS) mechanisms. These randomly select from among the surely identified sets and pay the revealed-most-preferred element from that set (assuming m is rationalizable).
Thus, the probability that x is paid under message m is simply the probability that an SI set E is drawn such that dom m (E) = {x}.
Definition 7 (Weighted Set-Selection Mechanisms). A mechanism ϕ : M → ∆(X ) is a weighted set-selection mechanism (WSS) if there exists some λ : SI(D) → R such that for every rationalizable m ∈ M R and every alternative x ∈ X ,
The requirement that ϕ(m) be a well-defined lottery places some restrictions on the weighting function λ. For example, it cannot put negative weight on any singleton set:
If λ({x}) < 0 and there is no other E ∈ SI(D) for which dom m (E) = {x}, then ϕ(m)(x) = λ({x}) < 0, which is forbidden. Furthermore, we have that
so it must be that E λ(E) = 1. These observations prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.
A weighted set-selection mechanism must be associated with a weighting function λ that satisfies
(1) E λ(E) = 1, and
Remark. A weighted set-selection mechanism uniquely determines the vector λ that represents it. That is, if λ and λ ′ are two different weighting vectors then the corresponding mechanisms ϕ and ϕ ′ differ on M R . This can be seen by considering a minimal (with respect to inclusion) SI set E for which λ(E) = λ(E ′ ), and an order ≻ which ranks all elements of E below every other element of X . The top element of E according to ≻ is chosen with different probabilities under ϕ and ϕ ′ when the choices are µ(≻). Thus, given the collection D, there is a one-to-one correspondence between WSS mechanisms and the vectors λ that define them.
Positivity on Switches
Recall the example in the introduction which shows that not any weighting function λ induces an incentive compatible mechanism. We now formalize a condition on λ which is precisely what's needed to guarantee incentive compatibility of the associated mechanism. We start with the following definition. test sets where the switch in the order of x and y will be revealed. For incentive compatibility of a WSS mechanism to hold, the total weight assigned by λ to the collection of switch test sets T(x, y, A) should be strictly positive. This would guarantee that, when comparing the lotteries ϕ(µ(≻)) and ϕ(µ(≻ x y )), the probability of x is higher in the former while that of y is higher in the latter.
Put another way, if a WSS mechanism ϕ does not put weight on any switch test set for x and y against any A, then announcing µ(≻) and µ(≻ x y ) will lead to the same lottery.
But then there is no strict incentive to tell the truth for either of those preferences, violating incentive compatibility. Thus, any incentive compatible WSS mechanism must put positive weight on at least one switch test set for each x, y, and A-a property we call switch positivity. 
Definition 9 (Switch Positivity
)
Dealing With Non-Rationalizable Messages
Switch positivity is clearly necessary for incentive compatibility since it guarantees that a subject with preference ≻ will not announce µ(≻ x y ) instead. But we also need to ensure that the subject has no incentive to announce any non-rationalizable messages. Because we allow for all monotonic extensions, the only way to accomplish this is to ensure that, for every ≻ and m
is dominated by ϕ(µ(≻)).
To visualize this requirement, return to the example of D 1 = {x, y}, D 2 = { y, z}, and But for preference y ≻ ′ x ≻ ′ z, we must have that every ϕ(m ′ ) maps into the cone emanating to the northwest from the truth-telling lottery yxz. In general, for any preference ≻, we must have that every ϕ(m ′ ) be in the cone of dominated lotteries for that preference. There are six such cones (one for each ≻), and the intersection of those cones is the dark gray area labeled Φ NR . Incentive compatibility requires that ϕ(m ′ ) ∈ Φ NR for each m ′ ∈ M NR . Note that the six vertices must be excluded from Φ NR because incentive compatibility requires that all non-rationalizable messages be strictly dominated; if one non-rationalizable maps into the same lottery as some truthful message, then an a subject with that preference will be indifferent between the truthful message and the equivalent non-rationalizable message. Strict incentive compatibility rules this out.
Formally, let ϕ(M R ) be the set of lotteries that can be obtained by announcing any rationalizable message and co(ϕ(M R )) be the convex hull of that set. We denote Φ NR =
co(ϕ(M R )) \ ϕ(M R ). Incentive compatibility requires that if m
The Characterization Theorem Theorem 2. A mechanism ϕ : M → ∆(X ) is incentive compatible with respect to E mon if and only if it is a weighted set-selection mechanism such that 15 In the figure there are six preferences and six vertices for Φ NR . In general, the number of vertices is equal to the cardinality of the range of ϕ(M R ). This is less than the number of preferences if there is some pair ≻ and ≻ ′ such that ϕ(≻) = ϕ(≻ ′ ). For example, if D = ({x, y},{y, z}) then µ(yxz) = µ(yzx) and µ(xz y) = µ(zx y), so φ(M R ) has only four vertices. In that case, Φ NR is a rectangle. (1) ϕ satisfies switch positivity; and
The proof of this theorem-provided in the appendix-proceeds in three steps: First, we characterize a set of restrictions on the lotteries ϕ(m) that are equivalent to incentive compatibility. Second, we show how an incentive compatible ϕ can be represented via a supermodular capacity, and how the restrictions on lotteries imposed by incentive compatibility translate into certain restrictions on that capacity. Third, we show that the capacity can be translated into a weighting vector λ-so that ϕ is in fact a weighted set-selection mechanism-and how the restrictions on the capacity imply that ϕ must satisfy switch positivity. Finally, we 'close the loop' by proving that any weighted setselection mechanism satisfying these two conditions is in fact incentive compatible.
Recall that our framework can handle the case of bundle payments (for example, paying subjects all of their choices) by expanding X to include subsets of i D i . But incentive compatibility requires that one use a WSS mechanism, and WSS mechanisms can only put positive probability on items in SI(D), which is a subset of i D i . Without explicit assumptions on complementarities, sets containing bundles will not be surely identified and therefore cannot be paid in any incentive compatible mechanism. See Azrieli et al. (2018) for an assumption on complementarities that does make paying for multiple decisions incentive compatible.
V. LOTTERIES VERSUS ACTS: A COMPARISON OF CHARACTERIZATIONS
In this section we compare IC mechanisms in the objective lotteries framework of the current paper to IC mechanisms in the more general acts set-up of our previous paper (Azrieli et al., 2018) . As explained in the introduction, we would like to show that in a certain sense there are more IC mechanisms when subjects view the randomization device as generating objective lotteries.
To formalize this idea, we must be able to compare directly a mechanism φ in the acts framework to a mechanism ϕ in the lotteries framework. In the acts framework (ignoring bundle payments), a mechanism is a function φ :
where Ω is a finite state space and X Ω is the set of all acts, i.e. mappings from Ω to X . To convert acts into lotteries, let ρ be a probability measure over Ω. 16 We say that (Ω, ρ, φ) generates ϕ if, for
If the above equality holds for every rationalizable message m ∈ M R then we say that (Ω, ρ, φ) generates ϕ on rationalizable messages.
Proposition 1.
If φ is an incentive compatible act-mechanism (defined on some state
space Ω), and ρ is a full-support probability distribution over Ω, then the lotteriesmechanism ϕ generated by (Ω, ρ, φ) is incentive compatible.
The proof of this proposition follows from the discussion in the introduction and is therefore omitted.
We now consider the opposite direction, taking an IC lotteries-mechanism and studying the equivalent act-mechanism that generates it. But the following example shows that (1) there can be many act-mechanisms that generate our IC lotteries-mechanism, and (2) some of those act-mechanisms may not be IC. In other words, the converse of Proposition 1 does not hold generally. The σ-algebra for ρ is the power set of Ω. 17 Thus, the experimenter is eliciting the entire preference ordering over X . This also can be done by asking subjects to rank the three options in X and use that ranking to infer what m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 would be. The RPS mechanism (or any IC mechanism) would then be used. The only difference is that a ranking experiment prohibits the announcement of non-rationalizable messages. See Bateman et al. (2007) or Crockett and Oprea (2012) for examples of ranking experiments.
In the lotteries framework, consider an RPS mechanism ϕ with λ(D i ) = 1/3 for each i.
The subject receives their revealed-most-preferred element of X with probability 2/3 and their revealed-second-most-preferred element with probability 1/3. A non-rationalizable message results in the uniform lottery over X .
This mechanism can be generated by an RPS mechanism φ in the acts framework,
where Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }-each corresponding to a decision problem-and a distribution ρ with ρ(ω i ) = 1/3 for each i. Here, both mechanisms are incentive compatible in their respective frameworks.
But ϕ can also be generated by the following non-incentive-compatible act-mechanism x, φ(m)(ω 2 ) = y, and φ(m)(ω 3 ) = z. This mechanism is not incentive compatible in the acts framework because beliefs are subjective: A subject who believes ω 3 will occur with high enough probability will prefer to reveal their true favorite element as if it were their second-most-preferred.
The next example further demonstrates that there are incentive compatible lotteriesmechanisms that cannot be generated by any incentive compatible acts-mechanism (even when restricted to rationalizable messages). Thus, in this sense, the set of IC mechanisms is strictly larger in the lotteries framework. In the lotteries framework, consider a mechanism with λ(D i ) = 0.4 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and λ(D 4 ) = −0.2. This mechanism pays the revealed-most-preferred element of X with probability 0.6 and the revealed-second-most-preferred element with probability 0.4.
Also, set ϕ(m) to be the uniform distribution over X whenever m is non-rationalizable.
By Theorem 2 this mechanism is incentive compatible.
However, this mechanism cannot be generated by any incentive compatible mechanism in the acts framework. To prove this, suppose that (Ω, ρ, φ) generates ϕ, where φ is incentive compatible. By Theorem 1 in Azrieli et al. (2018) , each ω ∈ Ω corresponds to some decision problem (or to a singleton) and pays the selected item from that problem.
Consider first ≻ with z ≻ x ≻ y. Since ϕ(µ(≻))(x) = 0.4, the set of ω's corresponding to D 1 or to the singleton {x} must have ρ-probability of 0.4. But, by a symmetric argument, the same is true for D 2 and { y} and to D 3 and {z}. But then ω ρ(ω) ≥ 1.2, a contradiction.
The difficulty in generating ϕ from an incentive compatible φ in Example 2 comes from λ assigning negative weights to certain SI sets. In fact, this exactly characterizes the cases where ϕ cannot be generated by an incentive compatible φ.
Proposition 2. Assume that ϕ is an incentive compatible lotteries-mechanism.
(1) If the associated weighting vector λ of ϕ is non-negative, then there exists an incentive compatible acts-mechanism φ (on some Ω) and a probability ρ on Ω such that (Ω, ρ, φ) generates ϕ on rationalizable messages.
(2) If the associated weighting vector λ of ϕ contains negative elements, then ϕ cannot be generated by any incentive compatible acts-mechanism φ (even when restricted to rationalizable messages).
For (1), the construction of the first mechanism in Example 1 can be generalized to any lotteries mechanism with non-negative λ to get a generating incentive compatible acts-mechanism. The proof of (2) is similar to the proof that ϕ cannot be generated by an incentive compatible acts-mechanism in Example 2. The details are omitted.
VI. CHOICE FROM LOTTERIES, REDUCTION, AND RDU PREFERENCES
Many experimental tests of decision-theoretic models ask subjects to make choices from menus of lotteries whose outcomes are dollar payments. In this case, payments in the RPS mechanism represent two-stage lotteries, where the 'upper' stage refers to the random draw of a decision problem, and the 'lower' stage refers to the draw of a dollar amount according to the chosen lottery from that problem.
It is possible that the subject "reduces" compound lotteries into one-stage lotteries according to the laws of probability, and thus that her preferences over the space of single stage lotteries (over money) completely determine her preferences over compound lotteries. The following example-adapted from Holt (1986)-shows that incentive compatibility of the RPS mechanism can fail when non-expected utility models (in the lower stage) are combined with the reduction of compound lotteries.
Definition 10 (Rank-Dependent Utility). A subject has rank-dependent utility (RDU) preferences if a simple lottery f = (x 1 , p 1 ; x 2 , p 2 ; . . .; x n , p n ) ∈ ∆(R) (with
is evaluated according to the functional The reason the RPS mechanism fails in this example stems from the well-known fact that reduction of compound lotteries, when combined with our monotonicity assumption, implies the Von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom on the space of single stage lotteries. 18 Consequently, if a model of preferences violates independence (as the RDU model does), but the reduction of compound lotteries is assumed, then that model must violate monotonicity. Without monotonicity, Theorem 1 cannot be applied and there is no guarantee that the RPS mechanism is incentive compatible.
In fact, we now show that for the decision problems in Example 3 there is no incentive compatible payment mechanism if any RDU preference is admissible. We need to slightly modify our framework in order to accommodate this example. Let ∆(R) be the set of all simple (finite support) lotteries on R. A degenerate lottery that pays $x with probability 1 is denoted by δ x . The subject faces the two decision problems from Example 3, D 1 = {l, δ 1 } and D 2 = {l, δ 2 }, where l is the lottery that pays 0 or 3 with equal probabilities.
We assume that the subject has RDU preferences over ∆(R), represented by a functional U q (for some u and q) as in Definition 10. Notice that this allows the subject to be indifferent between some of the lotteries. We therefore need to modify the definition of incentive compatibility to allow for weak preferences. We do that by requiring that, whenever a message is truthful, the output of the mechanism is (weakly) preferred to any other possible outcome, with strict preference whenever the other message is not truthful.
18 For a detailed discussion of this result and other related issues see Segal (1990) . Segal's axiom of "compound independence" is essentially the same as our monotonicity assumption. See also the discussion in Section III of Azrieli et al. (2018) .
Since we assume that the subject reduces compound lotteries, her preferences over the compound lotteries induced by the mechanism are already captured by her functional U q . Thus, a mechanism can be described by a function ϕ : M → ∆(R). Notice that we allow the mechanism to pay with arbitrary (simple) lotteries, not necessarily lotteries over {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Proposition 3. In the set-up described above, there exists no incentive compatible mechanism for the decision problems
The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix. While the proposition is stated for a particular pair of decision problems, we believe that this impossibility result is typical, and that for most experiments there will be no incentive compatible mechanism.
Thus, either reduction of compound lotteries or the domain of admissible preferences must be relaxed in order to get positive results.
VII. DISCUSSION
This paper focuses on the elicitation of multiple choices when an experimenter can randomize. From a theoretical perspective, our work is probably closest to the classic work of Gibbard (1977) , who characterizes strategy-proof mechanisms in a probabilistic context when only ordinal preferences can be elicited. He characterizes these mechanisms as a kind of random-dictatorship, whereby a "dictator" is an agent that solely determines the outcome. Our paper is comparable to the special case in which there is only one agent present. Gibbard does not, however, uncover the special structure of these dictatorial mechanisms in the form that we uncover, presumably because his interest was in understanding the implications of strategy-proofness across agents. Another important difference between the papers is that in Gibbard's framework agents report their entire ranking over alternatives, while we consider the more general case in which the favorite alternatives in several subsets are reported.
APPENDIX A:. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For all of the appendices, recall that x y indicates that either x ≻ y or x = y.
Suppose that E ∈ SI(D), and that E is not a singleton. Let {x, y} ⊆ E be arbitrary.
Consider the following two linear orders, and ′ , which are identical except in their ranking of x and y (which are adjacent): They rank all elements of X \E above all elements of E, and they rank x and y above all elements of E\{x, y}. However, x ≻ y and 
APPENDIX B:. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Step 1 (1) For every and every x, y with r(x, ) = r(y, ) − 1,
Proof. Assume ϕ is incentive compatible and fix some and some x, y with r(x, ) = r(y, ) − 1. If µ( ) = µ( x y ) then the conditions are trivially true. Now assume that they differ. Let z = x, y be some other element of X . Assume first that r(z, ) < r(x, ), so z is ranked above x (and y) according to . Incentive compatibility implies that ϕ(µ(
))(U(z, )). The same argument applies to any z ranked above x (according to ), which proves that ϕ(µ( ))(z) = ϕ(µ( x y ))(z) for any such z. A similar argument proves the assertion for elements z ranked below y. It follows that we must have ϕ(µ( ))(x) > ϕ(µ( x y ))(x) (and therefore ϕ(µ( ))(y) < ϕ(µ(
This concludes the proof of property 1. 19 Formally, x y ⇐⇒ y x y x and, for all other w, z ∈ X , w z ⇐⇒ w x y z. Note that x y is only well-defined if x and y are adjacent in .
As for property 2, whenever m ∈ M NR incentive compatibility implies that ϕ(µ( )) ⊐ Step 2: Capacity Representation A capacity is a set function v : 2
Definition 11. A capacity v satisfies switch positivity if for every x, y ∈ X and A ⊆ X \ {x, y} the following holds:
Lemma 6. If a mechanism ϕ is incentive compatible with respect to E mon then there exists a normalized and monotone capacity v that satisfies switch positivity such that
Proof. Given A ⊆ X , consider some order which ranks A at the bottom. Define v(A) = ϕ(µ( ))(A) := x∈A ϕ(µ( ))(x). Notice first that, under incentive compatibility, v is welldefined in the sense that it does not depend on the particular order used. Indeed, this follows from property (1a) in Lemma 5. It is also clear that v is normalized and monotone.
We now claim that v satisfies switch positivity. To see this, take any x, y and A ⊆ X \ {x, y}. Consider some order with L(x, ) = A ∪ {x} and L(y, ) = A ∪ {x, y}. We have
, so by property (1b) of Lemma 5
Finally, we need to show that
Fix m ∈ M R and some x ∈ X . We claim that there
, it is sufficient to show that the reverse inclusion holds for some ∈ µ −1 (m). To see this, start with an arbitrary ∈ µ −1 (m) and consider (x, m) . If this set is empty we are done. Otherwise, take the highest ranked element (according to ) in this set, say y. Then for any z ranked between y and x (including z = x) it cannot be that zR(m)y, so by a sequence of switches we can put y above x without changing the resulting choices. By repeating this procedure for every
we get the desired order, say ′ . For this order we have
as needed.
Step 3: Weighting Vector Representation Lemma 7. Given ϕ, if there exists a normalized and monotone capacity v that satisfies
for every m ∈ M R and every x ∈ X , then ϕ is a weighted set-selection mechanism that satisfies switch positivity.
Proof. Let v be a normalized and monotone capacity that satisfies switch positivity and represents ϕ as in the assertion of the lemma. As is well known (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995, e.g.) , any capacity can be uniquely represented as a linear combination of the 'unanimity capacities'. That is, there is a unique vector {λ(E)} E⊆X ,E = such that
We 
But if {x, y} ⊆ D i ⊆ B for no i then for every set E in the sum on the left it is also true that {x, y} ⊆ D i ⊆ E for no i, which implies that every such E is not SI. By induction on the size of B we can therefore prove that λ(B) = 0.
We next check that the vector λ satisfies switch positivity. Take any x, y ∈ X and A ⊆ X \ {x, y}. By the last paragraph,
Thus, λ satisfies switch positivity.
The last thing to check is that λ in fact represents the weighted set-selection mechanism ϕ as in Definition 7. This follows from (for
Step 4 Proof. To check that ϕ is incentive compatible we use Lemma 5. It follows immediately from the definition of a weighted set-selection mechanism that in a switch of adjacent two elements x, y the probability of any other element z being selected is not affected.
Further, we have just showed above that the probability of x goes strictly up after a switch that increases the rank of x and changes the truthful message. This proves property 1 of Lemma 5. Property 2 of Lemma 5 is satisfied by assumption.
APPENDIX C:. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
It will be convenient to think of any lottery f as a function f : R → R, with f (x) being the probability assigned to x by f . For instance, the lottery l in the proposition is iden- Proof. Consider some strictly increasing utility function u such that 1/2u(0) + 1/2u(3) = u(1). Then an expected utility maximizer (a special case of RDU preferences) with utility function u is indifferent between l and δ 1 , so both announcements (δ 1 , δ 2 ) and (l, δ 2 ) are truthful. By incentive compatibility this decision maker must also be indifferent between ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) and ϕ(l, δ 2 ), that is u · ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) = u · ϕ(l, δ 2 ).
First, it cannot be true that there is x ∈ R \ {0, 1, 3} such that ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 )(x) = ϕ(l, δ 2 )(x).
Indeed, let u be as above, and change the values of u in a small neighborhood of x (small enough that it does not affect any other point in the support of the two lotteries) to get a new increasing functionũ that still satisfies 1/2ũ(0) + 1/2ũ(3) =ũ(1). Then it cannot be true that both equalities u · ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) = u · ϕ(l, δ 2 ) andũ · ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) =ũ · ϕ(l, δ 2 ) hold simultaneously, a contradiction.
Thus, there are a, b, c ∈ R such that ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) − ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = aδ 0 + bδ 1 + cδ 3 . Consider a utility function u with u(0) = 1, u(1) = 2 and u(3) = 3. By the same argument as above we get that u ·ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) = u ·ϕ(l, δ 2 ), which implies a+2b +3c = 0. By considering another function u with u(0) = 1, u(1) = 3 and u(3) = 5 gives a + 3b + 5c = 0. Solving these two equations gives b = −2a and c = a.
To conclude, we showed that ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) − ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = −aδ 0 + 2aδ 1 − aδ 3 for some a ∈ R.
The fact that a > 0 follows by looking at an expected utility maximizer with the utility function u(x) = x (who strictly prefers the lottery l over δ 1 ). The fact that a ≤ 1/2 is obvious.
The proof of the above claim only considered EU preferences. The following claim makes use of RDU preferences which do not satisfy independence.
Claim 2. If ϕ is incentive compatible then ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ) = δ 1 and ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = l.
Proof. Let u be the function u(x) = 0 for x < 1, u(1) = 1, and u(x) = 3 for x > 1. Consider an RDU decision maker with utility function u and a probability weighting function q satisfying q(0) = 0, q(1/2) = 1/2, q(1) = 1. Any such decision maker prefers the lottery l over δ 1 and prefers δ 2 over l. Thus, for incentive compatibility, any such decision maker must prefer ϕ(l, δ 2 ) over ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 ), that is U q (ϕ(l, δ 2 )) > U q (ϕ(δ 1 , δ 2 )).
By the definition of u we have that To conclude the proof, notice that the same arguments can be applied to the choices in the second decision problem. That is, incentive compatibility requires that ϕ(l, l) = l and ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = δ 2 . Since we cannot have ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = l and ϕ(l, δ 2 ) = δ 2 at the same time, we conclude that an incentive compatible mechanism does not exist.
